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BEYOND MICROSOFT:  
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE SCA’S 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY PROBLEM 
Andrew Kirschenbaum* 
 
The Stored Communications Act governs U.S. law enforcement’s access to 
cloud data, but the statute is ill equipped to handle the global nature of the 
modern internet.  A pending U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. 
Microsoft, raises the question whether a warrant under the statute may be 
used to reach across international borders to obtain data that is stored in 
another country, regardless of the user’s nationality.  While the Court will 
determine whether this is an impermissible extraterritorial application of the 
current law, many have called for a legislative resolution to this issue. 
Due to the insufficiency of the current law, the limits of traditional judicial 
doctrines, and the inherent advantages the legislature has over the judiciary 
in addressing technological change, this Note also recommends a legislative 
resolution.  Building upon a legislative proposal, this Note proposes a 
framework with two separate sets of legal procedures based on user identity.  
These separate domestic and extraterritorial procedures provide a 
framework that would set clear guidelines for law enforcement and service 
providers while giving due respect to foreign sovereignty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA), passed more than thirty years ago 
as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),1 governs 
rapidly advancing technology.2  The SCA is widely viewed as outdated.3  The 
statute was originally passed to protect the privacy of electronic 
communications that were not clearly protected by the Fourth Amendment.4  
The SCA prohibits service providers5 from releasing electronic 
communications except under certain circumstances.6  The statute also 
provides procedures for law enforcement to compel the release of 
communications.7 
Courts have struggled to apply the SCA to changing technology.8  In 
particular, applying the SCA’s warrant provision9 to the contents of 
communications that can be moved and electronically stored all over the 
globe has posed a challenge.10  The question whether the warrant provision 
of the SCA would allow U.S. law enforcement officials to obtain electronic 
data stored on overseas servers, sometimes in fragmented form, was 
unforeseeable in 1986.  However, this once unforeseeable question was 
addressed by the Second Circuit in Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re 
 
 1. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft I), 829 F.3d 197, 231–33 
(2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring) (noting the need for Congress to modernize the SCA), 
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 
17-2); International Communications Privacy Act, S. 1671, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing 
amendments to the SCA); Brad Smith, A Legislative Path to Create New Laws Is Better than 
Arguing Over Old Laws, MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (June 23, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/ 
on-the-issues/2017/06/23/legislative-path-create-new-laws-better-arguing-old-laws/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YHW-U5KZ]; see also infra Part II.C. 
 4. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 145 
(3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Stored Communications Act was born from congressional recognition 
that neither existing federal statutes nor the Fourth Amendment protected against potential 
intrusions on individual privacy arising from illicit access to ‘stored communications in remote 
computing operations and large data banks that stored e-mails.’” (quoting Garcia v. City of 
Laredo, 702 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2012))); Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation 
Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 400 (2014) (“Congress intended [the 
SCA] as a stopgap measure designed to impose statutory protections until Fourth Amendment 
precedents became established.”). 
 5. This Note will use the terms “service provider” and “provider” as shorthand for 
providers of the two services the SCA protects, electronic communication services (ECS) and 
remote computing services (RCS).  These services are less distinguishable now than they were 
when Congress passed the SCA in 1986, and the providers under discussion in this Note 
generally supply both kinds of services. See Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 206–07; Kerr, supra note 
4, at 397; see also infra notes 127–29. 
 6. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a); see also Kerr, supra note 4, at 383. 
 7. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also Kerr, supra note 4, at 383. 
 8. See, e.g., Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 210–22; In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to 
Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 717–22 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, No. 16-1061, 2017 WL 3535037 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 17, 2017); see also Kerr, supra note 4, at 390–410 (describing technological and 
legal changes since the SCA was passed in 1986 that have made the SCA and ECPA outdated). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b)(1)(A). 
 10. See, e.g., Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 209. 
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Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft I)11 and is currently being considered by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.12  The issue in the case is whether it is an impermissible 
extraterritorial application of the SCA’s warrant provision for the 
government to compel a private party’s retrieval and production of email 
content from overseas servers.13  The case also raises an even more 
fundamental question:  what branch of the government is best equipped to 
address these problems?14 
Due in part to the limited language within the SCA, courts that have 
considered this question have come to conclusions that are all or nothing:  
either an SCA warrant has the potential to reach across borders to obtain the 
data of foreign citizens15 or its reach is arbitrarily limited by where a 
company stores its users’ data.16  In some cases, the latter conclusion would 
result in situations where U.S. law enforcement officials have indisputable 
probable cause to justify access to a U.S. citizen’s communications yet 
cannot obtain the records solely because of the provider’s choice of storage 
location.17  Meanwhile, placing no limit on the unilateral ability of U.S. law 
enforcement to use U.S.-based providers to retrieve data stored in a foreign 
country implicates international comity and may subject providers to 
conflicts of law.18  The potential ramifications are unsatisfactory to service 
providers,19 law enforcement,20 and judges alike.21 
 
 11. 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 12. Oral arguments in this case are set for February 27, 2018. Docket No. 17-2, U.S. SUP. 
CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/ 
17-2.html [https://perma.cc/3YJA-PRTH] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 13. Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 201. 
 14. Id. at 225 (Lynch, J., concurring) (“[T]he decision about whether and when to apply 
U.S. law to actions occurring abroad is a question that is left entirely to Congress.”). 
 15. See id. at 221 (majority opinion) (noting that the government’s reading of the SCA 
would allow “a United States judge [to] issue[] an order requiring a service provider to 
‘collect’ from servers located overseas and ‘import’ into the United States data, possibly 
belonging to a foreign citizen, simply because the service provider has a base of operations 
within the United States” (emphasis added)); In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No. 16-
4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *9 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017) (“[T]his Court concludes that 
compelling Google to provide all responsive information to the search warrant issued in this 
matter, regardless of whether the information is stored on computer servers outside of the 
United States, does not violate the presumption against extraterritorial application of United 
States law.”); Jennifer Daskal, There’s No Good Decision in the Next Big Data Privacy Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/opinion/data-abroad-
privacy-court.html [https://perma.cc/H8K6-R8PH]. 
 16. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *26 
(D.D.C. July 31, 2017). 
 17. See In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 724 (E.D. 
Pa.) (describing concerns about providers either storing data in countries that will not 
cooperate with U.S. law enforcement requests or using networks which move data throughout 
the world unpredictably), aff’d, No. 16-1061, 2017 WL 3535037 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017). 
 18. See Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 221. 
 19. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 20. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 21. See, e.g., Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 233 (Lynch, J., concurring) (“Although I believe 
that we have reached the correct result as a matter of interpreting the statute before us, I believe 
even more strongly that the statute should be revised . . . .”). 
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Current legislation and existing legal doctrines leave courts with limited 
and unappealing options to sufficiently address this problem.22  In addition, 
the legislature may be inherently better equipped to address this kind of issue, 
in part because courts may struggle to effectively resolve extraterritoriality 
questions due to constitutional uncertainty.23  Although the Fourth 
Amendment may apply to the email contents of U.S. citizens,24 the extent of 
Fourth Amendment protection for data stored abroad is less clear.25  Without 
a modern, workable statute to apply, the judiciary’s primary nonstatutory 
means of regulating government access to records—the Fourth 
Amendment—would apply inconsistently (or perhaps not at all) in these 
circumstances.26  Therefore, the best solution to this issue likely ought not to 
originate in the courts but from the legislature instead. 
The International Communications Privacy Act (ICPA) is a previously 
introduced bill that provides a good starting point for legislation in this area.27  
Building upon the ICPA and expanding on ideas introduced by scholars,28 
this Note proposes that new legislation should create two separate 
investigative instruments:  (1) a warrant for U.S. citizens and those with 
sufficient U.S. contacts and (2) a probable cause order for nationals of foreign 
countries.29  This structure would ensure sufficient safeguards based in 
comity, respect for the privacy laws of other nations, and cognizance of the 
position of providers who may be placed in the middle of a conflict-of-laws 
situation.  Simultaneously, it would allow legitimate investigations of U.S. 
citizens and those located in the United States to move forward swiftly and 
efficiently.  Law enforcement, service providers, customers, and courts 
would all benefit from the clarity of knowing when and how U.S. law 
 
 22. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 23. See infra Parts I.B.1, II.B. 
 24. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] subscriber 
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails ‘that are stored with, or 
sent or received through, a commercial ISP.’” (quoting Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 
455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007))); see also infra Part I.B.1. 
 25. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 26. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 27. International Communications Privacy Act, H.R. 3718, 115th Cong. (2017); 
International Communications Privacy Act, S. 1671, 115th Cong. (2017).  At the time of this 
Note’s publication, several lawmakers who had introduced the ICPA announced a revamped 
version of that legislation, the “Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act” or “CLOUD 
Act.” CLOUD Act, H.R. 4943, 115th Cong. (2018); CLOUD Act, S. 2383, 115th Cong. 
(2018); see also Press Release, Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator, Hatch Previews CLOUD Act:  
Legislation to Solve the Problem of Cross-Border Data Requests (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/2/hatch-previews-cloud-act-legislation-
to-solve-the-problem-of-cross-border-data-requests [https://perma.cc/65YK-U8K9] (referring 
to the CLOUD Act as an “outgrowth” of the ICPA).  While this Note does not discuss the new 
bill in depth, it notes some key differences between the ICPA and the CLOUD Act. See infra 
Part II.D.  Likewise, the CLOUD Act is referenced in relation to this Note’s proposed 
legislative solution. See infra Part III. 
 28. See Kerr, supra note 4, at 416–17 (recommending legislative change that accounts for 
user identity over data storage location); Daskal, supra note 15 (recommending the same). 
 29. This Note proposes a legislative framework that is not controlled by storage location.  
Thus, the two categories of subscribers addressed are citizens and permanent residents of the 
United States (“U.S. persons”) and foreign citizens without those U.S. contacts. 
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enforcement can access the contents of electronic communications stored by 
providers. 
Microsoft30 highlights a major problem with the SCA:  the law reaches the 
data of both citizens and noncitizens but fails to distinguish between 
subscribers who should be fully subject to the laws of the United States and 
those who fall under another government’s protection.  The best solutions to 
this problem will draw clear distinctions between those two groups. 
Part I of this Note first describes the current technological and legal 
landscape of electronic searches and seizures, specifically those occurring 
abroad.  Part I then discusses the Second Circuit’s holding in Microsoft I as 
well as the reasoning of judges that have rejected Microsoft I.  These cases 
highlight the difficulty of applying the SCA in a world of cloud technology 
and global data storage.  Part II explores the limited options available to the 
Supreme Court to address the issues in Microsoft, discusses why a legislative 
solution is better than what the courts can offer, looks at the potential 
legislative interests of the major stakeholders, and examines a legislative 
solution in the form of the ICPA.  Finally, Part III proposes a strategy, 
building upon the ICPA, that would explicitly differentiate between the data 
of United States and foreign customers of service providers who store data 
abroad. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Beginning with the relevant technological background, Part I.A discusses 
the structure of global cloud networks and the international trend of data 
localization laws.  Parts I.B and I.C describe the current state of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine in the realm of electronic communications as it applies 
to both citizens and noncitizens, as well as the statutory protections provided 
by the SCA.  Finally, Part I.D explores the difficulties of applying the SCA 
in this technological context beginning with the most prominent example, 
Microsoft, and proceeding to examine the cases that have declined to follow 
that decision. 
A.  The Current Technological Context:  
Cloud Storage and International Data Regulation 
High-speed internet and abundant electronic storage allow people to store, 
use, and access electronic data in a manner that poses challenges to existing 
laws like the SCA.  The rise of cloud computing and service providers’ use 
 
 30. Throughout the text of this Note, Microsoft refers generally to the case that has been 
granted certiorari and will be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-2).  Microsoft I refers to the Second Circuit’s 
holding in favor of Microsoft. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a 
Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft I), 829 F.3d 
197 (2d Cir. 2016).  Microsoft II refers to the Second Circuit’s denial of the motion to rehear 
the case en banc. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft II), 855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 
2017). 
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of servers31 throughout the world means that electronic information can be 
moved or reproduced across international borders almost instantaneously.32  
Service providers’ capacity to move data in this manner, however, has led to 
data localization and privacy measures that restrict the international flow of 
data.33 
1.  The Cloud and Network Architecture 
The Supreme Court has described cloud computing as “the capacity of 
Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather 
than on the device itself.”34  The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology defines cloud computing, perhaps more precisely, as “a model 
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”35 
Cloud computing is the technology that allows users of web-based email 
services (such as Google’s Gmail, Microsoft’s Outlook, and Yahoo Mail) to 
access and send communications from any device that can connect to the 
internet.36  This technology works by storing a user’s communications on the 
provider’s servers and giving an end user on-demand access to the data.37  
These cloud-based email services are ubiquitous throughout much of the 
world:  Google, for example, reported in early 2016 that Gmail had over one 
billion active worldwide users—more than doubling the roughly 425 million 
users the company reported in 2012.38 
Where and how this massive amount of data is stored depends on how a 
service provider has structured its network.39  Two varieties of network 
architecture are relevant to this Note.  The first is what Professor Paul 
Schwartz has called the “Data Localization” model, in which a company 
stores data in one country or region.40  Microsoft is one of the companies that 
 
 31. “A ‘server’ is ‘a shared computer on a network that provides service to clients.’” 
Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 202 n.2 (quoting HARRY NEWTON & STEVE SCHOEN, NEWTON’S 
TELECOM DICTIONARY 1084 (28th ed. 2014)). 
 32. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 366–67 (2015). 
 33. See Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 713–14 
(2015). 
 34. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
 35. See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL 
PUBLICATION 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING § 2 (2011). 
 36. See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 
1633 (2013); see also MELL & GRANCE, supra note 35, § 2 (using web-based email as an 
example of a type of cloud service model). 
 37. See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 35, § 2. 
 38. Frederic Lardinois, Gmail Now Has More Than 1B Monthly Active Users, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 1, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/01/gmail-now-has-more-than-
1b-monthly-active-users/ [https://perma.cc/L3RP-J4FC]. 
 39. See Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to Cloud Information:  Data Shards, Data 
Localization, and Data Trusts 5–6 (July 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008392 [https://perma.cc/X64Q-XRAX]. 
 40. Id. (manuscript at 5). 
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use this type of data storage scheme.41  The second type of cloud storage has 
been called the “Data Shard” model.42  “Sharded” data is separated into 
pieces that can be stored in separate locations.43  Partitioning data in this way 
has security benefits44 and is said to optimize network performance and 
efficiency.45  Sharding is used by Google for its cloud services, including 
Gmail.46 
Localization and sharding are two examples of different approaches to 
cloud storage.  However, providers using these approaches typically do not 
operate their networks in a uniform way that makes the location of data, or 
the provider’s knowledge thereof, predictable.  Professor Orin Kerr looked 
into the matter after the Second Circuit’s holding in Microsoft I and found 
that 
[s]ome providers make a point of figuring out the country of origin of each 
user, and they try to store user emails in that country or region.  Other 
providers don’t.  Some providers know in what country a particular user’s 
email will be located, and that answer is reasonably stable over time.  Other 
providers don’t, and it isn’t.  Some providers can access email stored abroad 
from wherever it is located.  Other providers can’t.47 
In short, though cloud networking strategies can be categorized generally, the 
specific operation of each provider’s network can and does vary.48 
2.  Maintaining Local Control of Data:  
Data Localization and International Privacy Concerns 
The volume of potentially sensitive cloud data stored throughout the world 
is an aspect of the global internet that may thwart governments’ efforts to 
regulate and protect sensitive information pertaining to their citizens.  The 
fact that many of these cloud providers are based in the United States and are 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction also drives these concerns.49  Since Edward 
Snowden exposed the broad scope of U.S. intelligence operations and 
electronic surveillance, a number of countries have moved to pass laws that 
 
 41. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft I), 829 F.3d 197, 202 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (explaining that Microsoft’s cloud service is “segmented into regions, and most 
customer data (e.g. email . . . ) is generally contained entirely within one or more data centers 
in the region in which the customer is located”). 
 42. See Schwartz, supra note 39 (manuscript at 5). 
 43. Chander & Lê, supra note 33, at 719. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 712 (E.D. 
Pa.), aff’d, No. 16-1061, 2017 WL 3535037 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017). 
 46. See Schwartz, supra note 39 (manuscript at 5). 
 47. Orin Kerr, The Surprising Implications of the Microsoft/Ireland Warrant Case, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/ 
11/29/the-surprising-implications-of-the-microsoftireland-warrant-case/ 
[https://perma.cc/MFB2-PBV3]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Chander & Lê, supra note 33, at 714. 
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would “localize” data.50  These laws attempt to ensure that electronic records 
are only stored domestically, within reach of that government and that 
government alone.51 
Some countries apply localization requirements to only certain kinds of 
data.  For example, Australia’s law applies to medical records that include 
personal identifying information.52  Other countries apply data localization 
laws more broadly, regulating all providers who operate within their 
borders.53  These governments justify their laws by citing international 
security concerns (specifically, foreign surveillance), citizens’ privacy 
concerns, domestic security concerns (specifically, law enforcement’s access 
to records), and domestic economic development.54 
A major recent development in the European Union, driven by personal 
privacy concerns, is the European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR).55  Effective May 25, 2018, the GDPR sets out new obligations for 
businesses that handle personal data and delineates new rights for the 
individuals to whom the data pertains.56  Under the GDPR, a “controller” or 
“processor”57 of data may only comply with a demand for data from a non-
EU court if the demand is “based on an international agreement” between the 
two nations.58  If a company violates this directive, it may suffer economic 
penalties.59 
The variations of this international trend reflect a common goal among 
governments to maintain control over access to electronic data pertaining to 
their citizens.  To accomplish these goals, many governments employ a 
policy of keeping data physically within their borders and imposing penalties 
on those who remove it. 
B.  Judicial Privacy Protection:  Constitutional Limits 
to Searches and Seizures Abroad and in the Cloud 
The massive amount of data described in Part I.A is a potential evidentiary 
treasure trove for law enforcement.  However, the Fourth Amendment 
protects “the people” from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”60  Third-
party cloud storage raises questions about what constitutes a search or seizure 
 
 50. Id. (“Anger at disclosures of U.S. surveillance abroad has led some countries to 
respond by attempting to keep data from leaving their shores . . . .”). 
 51. See id. at 679. 
 52. Id. at 683. 
 53. See id. at 682. 
 54. Id. at 713. 
 55. Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU). 
 56. Matt Burgess, What Is GDPR?  WIRED Explains What You Need to Know, WIRED 
(Jan. 12, 2018), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eu-legislation-compliance-
summary-fines-2018 [https://perma.cc/5MVV-8FMV]. 
 57. The “controller” is the entity that makes decisions about what data is stored, and the 
“processor” is the entity that does the actual processing of data. See Regulation 2016/679, 
supra note 55, art. 4(7)–(8). 
 58. See id. art. 48. 
 59. See id. art. 83. 
 60. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
1932 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
of electronic records held by a provider and, where providers have both U.S. 
and non-U.S. customers, who “the people” are. 
This Part looks at the strain that electronic storage and cloud technology 
place on traditional doctrines of search and seizure and at the difficulty of 
determining what protection the constitution affords foreign citizens and 
records stored in foreign countries. 
1.  Warrants, the Fourth Amendment, 
and Global Data Storage 
The history of the warrant as an investigative tool goes back to English 
common law, where a “general warrant” gave the holder “blanket authority” 
to perform a search that was not limited to a specific location.61  The Fourth 
Amendment was drafted with language designed to eliminate the abuses of 
these general warrants.62 
Warrants traditionally authorize the government to perform searches and 
seizures that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise prohibit.63  Though 
many warrants authorize both a search and a seizure, the two are distinct.64  
A search infringes on an individual’s objectively reasonable and societally 
recognized expectation of privacy.65  Seizures, on the other hand, interfere 
with an individual’s possessory interest in a meaningful way.66 
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Fourth Amendment 
protects consumers’ email and other electronic communications held by third 
parties.67  The traditional “third-party doctrine” holds that individuals do not 
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that has been 
disclosed to a third party.68  Therefore, under the third-party doctrine, even 
an individual who discloses information in reliance on a third party’s 
confidence loses Fourth Amendment protection with regard to the disclosed 
information.69 
However, exceptions to the doctrine are emerging as major forms of 
communication, such as email and cell phones, increasingly require 
 
 61. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–84 & n.21 (1980) (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965)). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 63. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). 
 64. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 65. Id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
 66. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. 
 67. United States v. Carpenter raises a potential challenge to the third-party doctrine in 
the context of cell phone records. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888–89 (6th 
Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (argued Nov. 29, 2017) (16-402).  At the time of this 
Note’s publication, the Court had not issued an opinion in this case. 
 68. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently 
has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties.”). 
 69. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
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disclosure to a third party.70  In United States v. Warshak,71 the Sixth Circuit 
recognized that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content 
of their emails and held that a warrantless search of those communications 
violated the Fourth Amendment.72  Courts that have addressed this and 
similar questions after Warshak acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment 
protects email content based on a reasonable expectation of privacy.73 
Where a Fourth Amendment “search” concerns an individual’s privacy, a 
Fourth Amendment “seizure” concerns the government’s meaningful 
interference with an individual’s possessory interest in an object.74  In the 
physical world, this is a simple concept:  if the government facilitates the 
removal of a mobile home, for example, it has seized that mobile home.75  
But when the warrant targets electronic records that are to be copied but 
otherwise undisturbed, it is unclear what exactly constitutes a seizure.76 
There is doctrinal ambiguity on the question whether electronically 
copying computer data should trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protections.77  
In many cases, electronic documents may be instantaneously copied and 
transferred in a manner similar to someone photocopying,78 photographing,79 
or writing down a serial number80 from potential evidence—all cases in 
which courts have held that there was no meaningful interference with the 
owner’s possessory interests and, thus, no Fourth Amendment seizure.81  
However, the relatively limitless nature of what can be electronically stored 
has caused courts in other cases to refer to large-scale copying of electronic 
data as a seizure.82 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not clarify the 
matter.  As to electronic records, it states that “[a] warrant under Rule 
41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the 
seizure or copying of electronically stored information.”83  The rule fails to 
define the parameters of what constitutes a seizure with regard to 
 
 70. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 
809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing the “content exception” to the third-
party doctrine). 
 71. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 72. See id. at 274. 
 73. See, e.g., Coughlin v. Town of Arlington, No. 10-10203-MLW, 2011 WL 6370932, 
at *11 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2011); In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical 
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 125. 
 74. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 75. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992). 
 76. See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L. J. 700, 
703 (2010) (“Whether and when copying [data] amounts to a seizure remains an unsolved 
puzzle.”). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See United States v. Thomas, 613 F.2d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 1980). 
 79. See United States v. Mancari, 463 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 80. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987). 
 81. See id.; Mancari, 463 F.3d at 596; Thomas, 613 F.2d at 793. 
 82. See United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2014) (describing 
mirroring a hard drive as a Fourth Amendment seizure); United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (referring to electronically copied 
files as “seized” pursuant to a warrant). 
 83. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
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electronically stored data and may imply that the two are different because it 
mentions copying as distinct from seizure.84 
Courts generally assume that a warrant unilaterally issued by a judge in the 
United States is only effective within this country.85  In the context of 
traditional search warrants, which require police presence during the search, 
“courts may not issue warrants for extraterritorial searches.”86  The typical 
understanding of a warrant’s reach is that “[t]he domestic warrant authority, 
whether construed under Rule 41, the common law, or a statutory authority, 
does not ordinarily extend to the property of foreigners abroad.”87 
Like the authority to issue warrants, the application of the Fourth 
Amendment is not universal.88  In determining whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to a search, the Supreme Court has looked at whether 
the search or seizure occurs within the United States or abroad as well as the 
identity and contacts of the individual invoking the right.89  Searches inside 
the United States, for example, even of a non-U.S. citizen, are governed by 
the Fourth Amendment.90  Additionally, U.S. citizens retain some Fourth 
Amendment rights when outside the United States.91  In contrast to the 
probable cause standard that applies within the United States, however, 
circuit courts have required mere “reasonableness” for searches of U.S. 
citizens abroad.92  As a result, the full warrant and probable cause 
requirements end at the border, even for U.S. citizens.  The reasonableness 
test that has been applied in the Second and Seventh Circuits balances the 
 
 84. See Mark Taticchi, Note, Redefining Possessory Interests:  Perfect Copies of 
Information as Fourth Amendment Seizures, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 476, 489–90 (2010). 
 85. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990) (noting that a 
warrant would be a “dead letter outside the United States”); United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 
880, 892–93 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. 
Embassies in E. Afr.), 552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[I]f U.S. judicial officers were to 
issue search warrants intended to have extraterritorial effect, such warrants would have 
dubious legal significance, if any, in a foreign nation.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(5)(A) 
(providing that warrants may issue for property “outside the jurisdiction of any state or district, 
but within . . . a United States territory, possession, or commonwealth”). 
 86. In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *15 
(D.D.C. July 31, 2017) (emphasis added). 
 87. Orin Kerr, Microsoft Challenged the Wrong Law.  Now What?, LAWFARE (Nov. 27, 
2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/microsoft-challenged-wrong-law-now-what 
[https://perma.cc/SNN9-D48W]. 
 88. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274–75. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies 
to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is 
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); Daskal, supra note 32, at 340 (“If [a search or 
seizure takes place] in the United States, the Fourth Amendment applies.”). 
 91. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270. 
 92. See United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr.), 
552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause has no 
extraterritorial application and . . . foreign searches of U.S. citizens conducted by U.S. agents 
are subject only to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.”); see also United 
States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 885 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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severity of the privacy invasion against the government’s justification for the 
search.93 
For searches of property located outside the United States, the owner of 
the property must have sufficient voluntary contacts with the United States 
to invoke the Fourth Amendment.94  Where courts find a noncitizen’s 
voluntary contacts with the United States insufficient, the Fourth Amendment 
simply does not protect that person.95  In the modern age, it is unclear whether 
voluntary contact with the United States online would similarly establish 
Fourth Amendment rights.96 
Thus, current Fourth Amendment doctrine is unsettled with regard to the 
copying of electronic records held by a service provider (as a third party) and 
the constitutional protections granted to records stored abroad. 
2.  Subpoenas and Extraterritoriality 
Though warrants generally do not reach records stored abroad, subpoenas 
often do.97  Where full Fourth Amendment or statutory protections requiring 
a warrant are nonexistent or ill defined—as is the case with electronic records 
stored abroad by third parties—subpoenas take on additional importance for 
government access to records.98 
In many cases, the government can use a subpoena to compel the 
production of evidence in an investigation.99  Grand jury subpoenas are 
issued in criminal investigations without judicial input,100 and they are 
presumptively enforceable unless the recipient can show that compliance 
would somehow be unreasonable.101  In criminal investigations, a subpoena 
 
 93. See Stokes, 726 F.3d at 893; In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 172. 
 94. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271–73. 
 95. See United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to nonresident aliens whose property is searched in a foreign 
country . . . .”).  For an in-depth discussion of what voluntary contacts courts have found 
sufficient or insufficient to establish Fourth Amendment rights, see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 293–94 (2015). 
 96. See Kerr, supra note 95, at 304–05 (arguing that purely online contact with the United 
States should not be sufficient for establishing Fourth Amendment rights). 
 97. See Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d. 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that 
a witness many not “resist the production of documents on the ground that the documents are 
located abroad”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987) (“A court or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of 
court, may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, objects, or other 
information relevant to an action or investigation, even if the information or the person in 
possession of the information is outside the United States.”); see also United States v. Bank 
of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 828 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 98. See Orin Kerr, What Legal Protections Apply to E-mail Stored Outside the U.S.?, 
WASH. POST (July 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2014/07/07/what-legal-protections-apply-to-e-mail-stored-outside-the-u-
s/?utm_term=.274bc6a00896 [https://perma.cc/FV5W-VL5G]. 
 99. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1) (“A subpoena may order the witness to produce any 
books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates.”). 
 100. See id. r. 17(a) (providing that federal subpoenas with the clerk’s signature and seal 
should be given to the requesting party to fill out and serve). 
 101. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (“[A] grand jury 
subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable, and the burden of 
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can compel the production of documents held abroad only if the recipient of 
that subpoena is subject to the court’s jurisdiction.102  The storage location 
of the subpoenaed documents is irrelevant103:  if a company has the power to 
move the records from one location to another, production is required unless 
a court finds that request is unreasonable.104  Inconsistent legal obligations 
based on the storage of records abroad may provide a ground to object to a 
subpoena, but a court may still choose to order a party to produce records 
even if it risks penalties for doing so abroad.105 
When a party challenges a subpoena based on extraterritoriality, the court 
will engage in a comity analysis.106  The factors to be balanced in a comity 
analysis include the importance of the documents to the investigation, how 
narrow and specific the request is, where the record originated, alternative 
options for obtaining the record, and the relative interests of the United States 
and the foreign state.107  Further, courts are more likely to command parties 
to produce their own records than records held on behalf of a third party or 
customer.108 
As demonstrated above, the absence of Fourth Amendment or statutory 
privacy protections allow subpoenas to reach records stored beyond the 
borders of the United States, limited in most cases only by a general comity 
analysis.109  For electronic records that are unevenly protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, the statutory protections discussed in Part I.C provide a second 
layer of privacy protection. 
C.  Statutory Privacy Protection:  The Stored Communications Act 
While courts possess general mechanisms like the Fourth Amendment and 
the doctrine of comity to protect privacy, legislatures in the United States 
regularly enact more specific statutory protections.  Often, these statutes are 
designed to provide protection in areas where the judiciary has not, or is not, 
 
showing unreasonableness must be on the recipient who seeks to avoid compliance.”); see also 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2) (“On motion made promptly, the court may quash or modify the 
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” (emphasis added)). 
 102. See Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d at 667; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 442 cmt. b. 
 103. See Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d at 667 (“The test for the production of documents is 
control, not location.”). 
 104. See United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901–02 (2d Cir. 1968); see 
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2). 
 105. See United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 826–29 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 106. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 543–44 (1987); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 
1474–78 (9th Cir. 1992) (balancing China’s interests in enforcing a law that prohibited 
disclosure of documents sought in discovery against the United States’ interest in obtaining 
the information); Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d at 826–29; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c). 
 107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c). 
 108. See Schwartz, supra note 39 (manuscript at 20). 
 109. See Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d. 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c); Kerr, supra note 98. 
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expected to provide protection.110  This Part explores the federal law111 that 
both protects and provides access to electronic data.  First, this Part explains 
the origins of the SCA, then it describes in greater detail what the warrant 
provision of the SCA does and how some important amendments have altered 
it. 
1.  A Brief History of the SCA 
The SCA,112 enacted as Title II of the ECPA,113 creates privacy rights for 
certain types of electronic communications.114  The statute also provides 
procedures for law enforcement to compel disclosure of those records.115  
Congress passed the SCA to provide statutory protection for electronic 
records that were not clearly protected by the Fourth Amendment.116 
The SCA protects the records of individuals using electronic 
communications services (ECS) and remote computing services (RCS).117  
The distinction between these two was meaningful in 1986:  “[t]he ECS 
protections covered email; the RCS protections covered contents of 
communications transmitted for remote storage and processing by services 
available to the public.”118  Today, the distinction raises “complex and 
perhaps unanswerable questions” about how the law applies to providers and 
services that are often multifunctional and might be classified as both ECS 
and RCS.119 
Section 2703 of the SCA sets procedures for government access to the 
electronic records that § 2702 protects.120  While different classes of records 
receive different levels of protection, the procedures necessary for acquiring 
more-protected records also cover less-protected records (i.e., a warrant may 
authorize the government to obtain any records that a subpoena could be used 
 
 110. See Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 1117, 1140 (2017) (“Legislatures usually pass privacy laws when it seems 
necessary because legislators expect the courts to stay out.”). 
 111. This Note focuses on federal law enforcement’s power under the ECPA and SCA, and 
thus foreign surveillance and data collection under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) is outside of its scope.  For a discussion of how FISA and related authorities treat 
territoriality, see Daskal, supra note 32, at 343–54. 
 112. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).  
 113. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 114. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702; see also Kerr, supra note 4, at 383. 
 115. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also Kerr, supra note 4, at 383–84. 
 116. See Kerr, supra note 4, at 376–77 (“The original ECPA was designed as a statutory 
stand-in for uncertain Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 117. 18 U.S.C. § 2702. 
 118. See Kerr, supra note 4, at 395.  For example, a commercial email provider might be 
classified as an ECS when it stores the unopened email of a subscriber but as an RCS after the 
email is opened and stored on the provider’s servers. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the 
Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1208, 1216 (2004). 
 119. See Kerr, supra note 4, at 397; see also Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for 
Electronic Communications:  The Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 382–83 (2009). 
 120. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
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to obtain).121  With exceptions, the statute requires law enforcement to obtain 
a warrant to compel a provider to release contents of communications.122  
Section 2703 also creates a court order123 and allows for the release of 
noncontent name, address, and other records by subpoena.124 
2.  The SCA’s Warrant Provision 
The warrant provision125 of the SCA provides that the government may 
require a service provider to disclose the contents of certain electronic 
communications “pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures 
described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a 
State court, issued using State warrant procedures).”126  On its face, the SCA 
requires a warrant for emails in “electronic storage” with an ECS for fewer 
than 180 days127 and for records stored with an RCS in lieu of providing 
notice to the subscriber.128  However, it has been the DOJ’s practice since 
2013 to obtain warrants for all email content that it seeks in criminal cases.129 
Warrants under the SCA are issued “using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”130—specifically, Rule 41.131  Rule 41 
codifies the constitutional requirement that law enforcement must establish 
probable cause to obtain a warrant132 and sets limits on a court’s jurisdiction 
that are typically based on the location of the person or property targeted by 
the warrant.133  Prior to the SCA’s amendment in 2001, Rule 41 limited a 
court’s jurisdiction under the statute to issue a warrant to persons or property 
located within that court’s district134 or for property outside that district if it 
related to a crime that occurred within the issuing district.135 
 
 121. See id. § 2703(c). 
 122. Id. § 2703(a)–(b)(1)(A). 
 123. Id. § 2703(d). 
 124. Id. § 2703(c)(2). 
 125. Id. § 2703(a)–(b)(1)(A). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. § 2703(a). 
 128. Id. § 2703(b)(1). 
 129. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-528, at 9 (2016) (“Soon after [United States v. Warshak], the 
Department of Justice began using warrants for email in all criminal cases.  That practice 
became Department policy in 2013.”); see also Statement, Richard Salgado, Director, Law 
Enf’t & Info. Sec., Google Inc., Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Data 
Stored Abroad:  Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital Era (June 15, 
2017) (unpublished testimony), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20170615/106117/ 
HHRG-115-JU00-Wstate-SalgadoR-20170615.pdf [https://perma.cc/32GZ-MYCN] (“[A] 
warrant-for-content standard is effectively the law of the land today. This standard is observed 
by governmental entities and providers alike . . . .”). 
 130. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b)(1)(A). 
 131. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
 132. Id. r. 41(d) (“After receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge . . . 
must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for . . . property . . . .”). 
 133. See id. r. 41(b). 
 134. See id. r. 41(b)(1). 
 135. See id. r. 41(b)(5).  Warrants issued under Rule 41(b)(5) are limited to property that 
can be found either in a U.S. territory, possession, or commonwealth, or on property abroad 
that has some connection to U.S. diplomatic or consular missions. See id. r. 41(b)(5)(A)–(C). 
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In the wake of September 11, 2001, Congress amended the SCA’s warrant 
provision in two key ways.  First, it expanded a court’s jurisdiction to issue 
SCA warrants beyond the standard limits of Rule 41—jurisdiction to issue an 
SCA warrant may be premised solely on the issuing court’s jurisdiction over 
the crime the government is investigating.136  This amendment “expand[s] a 
court’s authority to issue a warrant [under the SCA] beyond Rule 41.”137 
Second, Congress changed the language of § 2703 from “issued under the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure” to “issued using the procedures 
described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”138  At least one judge 
characterized the change as an expression of congressional intent that SCA 
warrants be bound by “some—but not all—of the requirements of Rule 
41.”139  Legislative history addressing this change indicates a concern about 
jurisdictional issues caused by the fact that a judge in the district where the 
service provider was located had to issue the warrant.140  The 2001 
amendments move the SCA away from Rule 41 in some key respects—but 
how far away is unclear and has been a point of disagreement among courts 
interpreting the SCA.141 
D.  What’s Extraterritorial When It Comes to the SCA?:  
Microsoft I and Its Rebellious Progeny 
As the previous Parts explain, the SCA regulates the government’s access 
to data stored by service providers that use global storage networks.  With 
regard to content records, this raises an issue as to whether compelling the 
retrieval and production of records stored abroad constitutes an 
extraterritorial extension of the SCA warrant.  This Part explores how courts 
have interpreted the SCA in light of this issue. 
First, Part I.D.1 explores the legal rationales for the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Microsoft I that data stored abroad are out of the reach of an SCA 
 
 136. See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A) (2012) (providing that warrants under the SCA can be 
issued by “any district court of the United States . . . or any United States court of appeals 
that . . . has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated”); see also In re Search Warrant 
to Google, Inc., No. MAG 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *8 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017) 
(discussing this amendment to the SCA). 
 137. In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2985391, at *8. 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (emphasis added). 
 139. In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *21 
(D.D.C. July 31, 2017). 
 140. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, at 57 (2001) (introducing the SCA amendment as 
permitting “nationwide” service of warrants to avoid a situation where investigators looking 
for emails related to a crime in their own city must enlist investigators in another state simply 
because the service provider is located there). 
 141. Compare Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft I), 829 F.3d 197, 213 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (“Although some [amendments] address the reach of SCA warrants, none of the 
amendments contradicts the term’s traditional domestic limits.”), with In re Search of Info. 
Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 
Inc., 2017 WL 3445634, at *21 n.24 (“[W]hile § 2703 incorporates more than just the probable 
cause requirement of Rule 41, the territorial limitations of Rule 41 are not among the Rule 41 
‘procedures’ applied to SCA warrants.”). 
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warrant.  Part I.D.2 then looks at the strong dissenting opinions from the 
Second Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc,142 as well as a series of district 
court opinions rejecting Google’s use of the Microsoft I precedent to deny 
certain requests under the SCA. 
1.  Microsoft I 
In Microsoft I, the U.S. government suspected that a customer’s emails 
contained evidence of drug trafficking and served Microsoft with an SCA 
warrant commanding production of the emails.143  Microsoft produced some 
noncontent records but moved to quash the warrant on the ground that the 
content was stored on servers located outside the territorial reach of the SCA 
warrant in Ireland.144  The court analyzed the request based on the data 
storage location.145  The nationality of the subscriber targeted by the 
investigation was undisclosed.146 
The court’s decision hinged on whether the use of an SCA warrant to 
retrieve records stored abroad violates the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, a canon of construction that assumes federal statutes are 
“‘meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,’ 
unless a contrary intent clearly appears.”147  Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd.148 and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community149 set forth a 
two-part approach to analyze these cases.  First, the court determines whether 
the provision of the statute explicitly permits extraterritorial application.150  
If the statute is not explicit in this regard, the court still must determine 
whether the “application” of the statute—here, using the warrant to compel 
Microsoft to bring records stored abroad into the United States to produce to 
law enforcement—is extraterritorial.151  This second-stage determination 
examines the request in light of the “‘territorial events or relationships’ that 
are the ‘focus’ of the relevant statutory provision.”152 
The Second Circuit held that the statute does not provide for extraterritorial 
application of SCA warrants and that the application of the warrant to obtain 
records stored in Ireland under the control a U.S. entity did constitute an 
 
 142. See generally Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-
Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft II), 855 F.3d 53 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc). 
 143. Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 200. 
 144. Id. at 200–01. 
 145. Id. at 201 (framing the issue as whether a warrant can “require a service provider to 
retrieve material from beyond the borders of the United States”). 
 146. Id. at 230 (Lynch, J., concurring) (“Because Microsoft relies solely on customers’ self-
reporting in classifying customers by residence, and [generally] stores emails . . . on local 
servers—and because the government did not include in its warrant application such 
information . . . we do not know the nationality of the customer.”). 
 147. Id. at 210 (majority opinion) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247, 255 (2010)). 
 148. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 149. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 150. Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 210. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 216 (quoting Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 183 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
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extraterritorial application of the warrant provision.153  Federal law 
enforcement, therefore, could not use the warrant authority under the SCA to 
obtain the records; it would instead have to request the information from the 
Irish government through a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).154 
Though the case was decided on statutory rather than constitutional 
grounds, the court referenced the traditional limits of the Fourth Amendment 
and warrants at both stages of the extraterritoriality analysis.  In discussing 
the textual limits of the SCA, the court stressed that Congress used “warrant” 
as a “term of art” in the SCA, which limits the statutory instrument in the 
same ways traditional search warrants are limited.155 
Turning to the second prong of the Morrison analysis, the court determined 
that the SCA’s focus is privacy.156  The court based this conclusion on the 
statute’s textual ties to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure157 and 
Congress’s intent to extend Fourth Amendment protections to electronic 
communications.158  The court concluded that the warrant was applied 
extraterritorially because the SCA protects privacy where the data is accessed 
(i.e., its storage location).159 
Further explaining the Fourth Amendment reasoning for its holding, the 
court opined that executing an SCA warrant turns the recipient entity into an 
agent of the government.160  The result of this agency relationship is that “the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause applies in full force to the private 
party’s actions.”161  Thus, the act of accessing the information at its stored 
location outside the United States is the act of a government agent rather than 
an independent service provider.162  The court noted that this kind of 
compelled cooperation with a search is not unique to the SCA and does not 
 
 153. Id. at 222. 
 154. Id. at 221.  MLATs “allow signatory states to request one another’s assistance with 
ongoing criminal investigations, including issuance and execution of search warrants.” Id.  The 
MLAT process is considered an unappealing solution for law enforcement due to the long wait 
time for compliance and the fact that the United States does not even have these treaties with 
many countries. See In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 
714 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, No. 16-1061, 2017 WL 3535037 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017); Schwartz, 
supra note 39 (manuscript at 17). 
 155. Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 212–13 (“Congress intended to invoke the term ‘warrant’ with 
all of its traditional, domestic connotations.”). 
 156. Id. at 220. 
 157. Id. at 218 (noting that the statute adopts Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and that Rule 41 “reflects the historical understanding of a warrant as an instrument 
protective of the citizenry’s privacy”). 
 158. Id. at 219–20. 
 159. Id. at 220 (“Having . . . determined that the [SCA] focuses on user privacy, we have 
little trouble concluding that execution of the Warrant would constitute an unlawful 
extraterritorial application of the [SCA].”). 
 160. See id. at 214 (“When the government compels a private party to assist it in conducting 
a search or seizure, the private party becomes an agent of the government . . . .”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. 
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remove the SCA warrant from the territorial restrictions associated with 
warrants.163 
The Microsoft I court also rejected the notion that an SCA warrant is a 
warrant-subpoena “hybrid” that takes on the extraterritorial properties of a 
subpoena.164  The court found no textual or contextual support for this view 
in the statute165 and rejected the idea that “Congress intended to jettison the 
centuries of law requiring the issuance and performance of warrants in 
specified, domestic locations, or to replace the traditional warrant with a 
novel instrument of international application.”166 
Moreover, the court distinguished the email content at issue from a party’s 
own records167 and banking records in which depositors do not have a 
protectable interest.168  In Microsoft I, the records were different because 
Microsoft was “merely a caretaker for another individual or entity” who had 
a “protectable privacy interest” in the emails.169  Despite some superficial 
similarities in the process of compliance with the instrument, the court found 
that SCA warrants are wholly distinct from subpoenas.170 
The Second Circuit concluded that SCA warrants cannot be used to compel 
service providers to produce email content stored outside the United 
States.171  This strict limit on SCA warrants provoked backlash both within 
the Second Circuit and in district courts throughout the country, as other 
providers (primarily Google) began invoking the decision to deny requests 
for records that previously would have been released.172 
2.  Microsoft II Dissents and the District Courts 
In Microsoft II, the Second Circuit denied the government’s motion to 
rehear the case en banc by a four-to-four plurality.173  All four dissenting 
judges wrote separate opinions expressing their disagreement with both the 
legal conclusions in and the policy ramifications of Microsoft I.174 
 
 163. See id. (“[T]he law of warrants has long contemplated that a private party may be 
required to participate in the lawful search or seizure of items belonging to the target of an 
investigation.”). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (“[T]he SCA recognizes the distinction [between warrants and subpoenas] and, 
unsurprisingly, uses the ‘warrant’ requirement to signal (and to provide) a greater level of 
protection to priority stored communications . . . .”). 
 166. Id. at 214–15. 
 167. See id. at 215. 
 168. Id. at 216 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976)). 
 169. Id. at 215. 
 170. Id. at 214–15. 
 171. Id. at 222. 
 172. See In re Search of Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as 
[redacted]@gmail.com, No. 2:16-mj-02197-DUTY-1, 2017 WL 3263351, at *9 (C.D. Cal. 
July 13, 2017) (“Before the Microsoft I ruling, Google routinely responded to SCA warrants 
by querying its global network, foreign and domestic.”); In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., 
No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *1 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017); Kerr, supra note 47. 
 173. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft II), 855 F.3d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 174. See id. at 60 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); id. at 62 (Cabranes, J., dissenting); id. at 69 
(Raggi, J., dissenting); id. at 74 (Droney, J., dissenting). 
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Following the dissenting judges in Microsoft II, every district court that 
has ruled on this issue has held that the application of an SCA warrant to 
obtain records175 stored by a provider abroad is permissible.176  Judges have 
articulated some distinct but often overlapping legal reasons for declining to 
follow Microsoft I.  First, the warrant-subpoena hybrid view would hold that 
the effect of the SCA’s warrant provision—what it permits the government 
to do and what it requires of service providers—should control rather than 
the legislature’s choice of words.177  Second, the Fourth Amendment-based 
rationale concludes that, when law enforcement officers execute an SCA 
warrant, they do not “seize” the records when they are stored abroad but 
merely search the records once they have been brought within the United 
States.178  Third, the district courts in which Google has raised objections 
pursuant to Microsoft I have distinguished its holding based on the network 
design of each provider.179  These lines of reasoning are addressed in turn. 
a.  Warrant-Subpoena Hybrid View 
The first dissenting opinion in Microsoft II, written by Judge Dennis G. 
Jacobs, notes parenthetically that an SCA warrant “functions as a subpoena 
though the Act calls it a warrant.”180  Most of the judges who have disagreed 
with Microsoft I discuss this view, and it was central to the district court 
opinion that Microsoft I reversed.181  These judges distinguish SCA warrants 
 
 175. There is some disagreement among these judges on the result under the first prong of 
the Morrison test. Compare In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2985391, at *9 
(“The Court concludes that a plain reading of the SCA reveals it does not contain a clear 
expression of Congressional intent of extraterritorial application.”), with In re Search of Info. 
Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 
No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *15 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017) (“In the SCA, 
Congress authorized the government to use an SCA warrant, a subpoena, or a § 2703(d) order 
to compel defined types of service providers subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to 
disclose electronic records under its control, including such records stored abroad . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 176. See In re Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1278 (N.D. 
Ala. 2017); In re Search of Content Stored at Premises Controlled by Google Inc., No. 16-mc-
80263-RS, 2017 WL 3478809, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017); In re Search of Info. 
Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 
Inc., 2017 WL 3445634, at *1; In re Search of Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as 
[redacted]@gmail.com, 2017 WL 3263351, at *8; In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., 2017 
WL 2985391, at *1; In re Two Email Accounts Stored at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 2017 
WL 2838156, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2017); In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to 
Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 721 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, No. 16-1061, 2017 WL 3535037 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 17, 2017). 
 177. See, e.g., Microsoft II, 855 F.3d at 60–62 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 178. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 721. 
 179. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 180. Microsoft II, 855 F.3d at 60. 
 181. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he [SCA warrant] is a hybrid:  
part search warrant and part subpoena.  It is obtained like a search warrant . . . .  On the other 
hand, it is executed like a subpoena . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Microsoft Corp. v. United States 
(In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp.) (Microsoft I), 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-2). 
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from traditional warrants based on the subpoena-like manner of the SCA 
warrant’s execution.182 
Under this view, an SCA warrant is simply “the procedural mechanism by 
which the government may require a service provider to disclose the contents 
of electronic communications.”183  The instrument is called a warrant but is 
bound by the procedures of Rule 41 only as far as probable cause is 
concerned.184  An SCA warrant is not bound by the territorial concerns of 
warrants because it operates by requiring disclosure as opposed to 
authorizing government entry and seizure of materials from some 
premises.185 
The cases distinguish SCA warrants from traditional search warrants, 
which “authorize government action as to places,” because SCA warrants 
“authorize government action on persons.”186  SCA warrants, unmoored 
from the traditional territorial limits of search warrants, focus on the company 
that controls and can produce the records rather than on the place where the 
records are stored.187  If the company is within the court’s jurisdiction and 
has the ability to bring the records within the jurisdiction, then the application 
of the statute is not extraterritorial.188 
b.  Fourth Amendment Search-but-Not-Seizure View 
The incongruity of the term warrant (with its territorial and Fourth 
Amendment implications) in the SCA and the reality that the service provider 
and not the government is the only party making (electronic) contact with 
anything outside the United States when warrants are executed lead some 
judges to adopt the “search-but-not-seizure” view.189  The simplest statement 
of this argument comes from Judge José A. Cabranes’s observation that the 
only part of Microsoft’s conduct that would have been unlawful under the 
SCA, had there been no warrant, was giving the customer’s records to the 
government.190  While there is a statutory—and perhaps even a 
 
 182. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, No. 16-1061, 2017 WL 
3535037, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *17 
(D.D.C. July 31, 2017). 
 185. See In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, 2017 WL 3535037, at *7. 
 186. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft II), 855 F.3d 53, 65 n.19 (2d Cir. 
2017) (Cabranes, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 70 (Raggi, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 71; see also id. at 61 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“Extraterritoriality need not be 
fussed over when the information sought is already within the grasp of a domestic entity served 
with a warrant.  The warrant in this case can reach what it seeks because the warrant was 
served on Microsoft, and Microsoft has access to the information sought.”). 
 189. See In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *9 
(D.N.J. July 10, 2017) (holding that an SCA warrant “calls for a search and not a seizure”). 
 190. Microsoft II, 855 F.3d at 68 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (“Microsoft did not need a 
warrant to take possession of the emails stored in Ireland.  Nor did it need a warrant to move 
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constitutional—privacy interest in stored electronic communications under 
this view, that privacy interest is not infringed (and thus, the protections of a 
warrant do not apply) until the records are handed off to the government.191 
This argument is distinct from the argument that an SCA warrant is not a 
traditional warrant, though the two are not mutually exclusive.192  They both 
lead to the same conclusion:  obtaining records stored on foreign servers does 
not constitute an extraterritorial application of the SCA.193  However, this 
view is less about distinguishing SCA warrants from traditional warrants and 
is more focused on how Fourth Amendment doctrine applies to cases where 
the government is passive throughout much of the process.194 
The crux of this position is that nothing Microsoft or Google does in 
moving data around—even though they are doing so in order to comply with 
the government’s demands—constitutes a Fourth Amendment “seizure” or 
“search.”195  When an SCA warrant is executed, the Fourth Amendment (and 
thus the warrant requirement) is only triggered when the provider turns the 
records over to the government for inspection.196  That “search” by the 
government, once it has the records in hand, occurs domestically.197  The fact 
that “the warrant calls for a search and not a seizure” satisfies the second 
prong of the Morrison test because “the conduct relevant to the 
extraterritorial analysis—i.e., the location of the search—occurs entirely in 
the United States.”198 
For the most part, the courts that articulate this argument express the view 
that “[e]lectronically transferring data from a server in a foreign country to 
Google’s data center in California does not amount to a ‘seizure’ because 
there is no meaningful interference with the account holder’s possessory 
interest in the user data.”199  Some judges that extend this reasoning go on to 
 
the emails from Ireland to the United States.  It already had possession of, and lawful access 
to, the targeted emails from its office.”). 
 191. See In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 721 (E.D. 
Pa.) (“When Google produces the electronic data in accordance with the search warrants and 
the Government views it, the actual invasion of the account holders’ privacy—the searches—
will occur in the United States.”), aff’d, No. 16-1061, 2017 WL 3535037 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 
2017). 
 192. A number of courts, in reasoning through their rejection of the Microsoft I holding, 
have articulated both arguments. See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with 
[redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-
00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *15–22 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017). 
 193. See In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2985391, at *9; In re Search 
Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 722. 
 194. See In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2985391, at *9. 
 195. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-757 (GMH), 2017 WL 2480752, at *10 
(D.D.C. June 2, 2017), aff’d, No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634 (D.D.C. July 31, 
2017). 
 196. In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 721–22. 
 197. Id. (holding that the account holder’s privacy is not invaded until the government 
searches the records, and “the actual invasion of the account holders’ privacy—the searches—
will occur in the United States”). 
 198. In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2985391, at *9. 
 199. In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 720; see supra 
Part I.B.1. 
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explain why the service provider is not acting as an agent of the government 
when it transfers data.200  Because the service providers in these cases already 
had lawful possession of the records in question, they cannot be said to have 
acted as a government agent to “seize” anything.201 
c.  Distinguishing the Google Cases from Microsoft I on the Facts 
An important nuance to the discussion above is the difference between the 
facts of Microsoft and the Google cases in which judges have declined to 
extend Microsoft I.  The data at issue in Microsoft, on the one hand, is 
apparently all stored on a server in Ireland.202  There are indications in the 
record that the target subscriber self-identified as Irish.203  Regardless, due to 
the storage location, the MLAT procedures were available for the 
government to petition Ireland for access.204  In fact, the Irish government 
expressed its willingness to facilitate the U.S. government’s access to the 
content through the MLAT procedure.205 
The Google cases, on the other hand, involve electronic data that is sharded 
and distributed in pieces to servers throughout the world.206  This means that 
such data may only be recognizable after Google reconstructs it.207  The 
record in some cases indicates that the only Google personnel authorized to 
access the data shards are located in the United States.208  These elements of 
Google’s network animate the policy concerns of many of the judges who are 
worried about sanctioning a situation in which neither the United States nor 
any other nation may access the data in question.209  Not only would pursuing 
the MLAT procedure lead to “a global game of whack-a-mole” but “the 
MLAT process would be useless because, as Google states, the only 
 
 200. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft II), 855 F.3d 53, 72 (2d Cir. 
2017) (Raggi, J., dissenting). 
 201. See id.; In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-757 (GMH), 2017 WL 2480752, at *10 
(D.D.C. June 2, 2017), aff’d, No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634 (D.D.C. July 31, 
2017).  Google has argued that it does not act as an agent of the government when it retrieves 
records from the overseas storage location, complicating the company’s reliance on 
Microsoft I. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored 
at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2480752, at *10. 
 202. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft I), 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d 
Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 
2017) (No. 17-2). 
 203. Id. at 230 (Lynch, J., concurring) (explaining that Microsoft “relies . . . on customers’ 
self-reporting in classifying customers by residence, and stores emails (but only for the most 
part . . . ) on local servers”). 
 204. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 205. Brief for Ireland as Amicus Curiae at 4, Microsoft I, 829 F.3d 197 (No. 14-2985-CV). 
 206. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 2017 WL 3445634, at *2; see also supra Part I.A. 
 207. In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *2 (D.N.J. 
July 10, 2017). 
 208. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 2017 WL 3445634, at *26. 
 209. See id. 
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personnel with the authority to access user communications are located in the 
United States.”210 
II.  THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF MICROSOFT 
AND CALLS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in 
Microsoft.211  Few, however, are optimistic that resolution of this case will 
solve the broader challenges posed by global cloud storage networks.  Some 
of the judges who authored the opinions discussed in Part I expressed their 
belief that, more than anything, Congress needs to act in this area.212  Not 
even major service providers like Google or Microsoft think that the 
Microsoft I verdict creates a viable standard moving forward.213  Many law 
enforcement officials have voiced concerns and described the negative 
effects that this decision has had on their ability to conduct investigations.214 
Part II.A below discusses the limited judicial options for resolving 
Microsoft and suggests that statutory protections might be a better fit for new 
technologies.  Part II.B then describes what the stakeholders in this debate 
would want out of such legislation.  Finally, Part II.C discusses a legislative 
proposal to amend the SCA—the International Communications Privacy Act. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Limited Options in Microsoft 
In Microsoft, the Supreme Court must choose between two positions, both 
having far-reaching implications.215  On the one hand, a verdict for Microsoft 
may arbitrarily limit legitimate law enforcement investigations, potentially 
forcing officials (who have satisfied the probable cause requirement) to 
petition foreign governments for records pertaining to U.S. citizens.216  On 
the other hand, a verdict for the government would “broadcast to the world 
 
 210. Id.; see also In re Search of Content That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 
No. 16-mc-80263-LB, 2017 WL 1487625, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (“[O]nly Google 
personnel on the [U.S.-based legal] team are authorized to access and produce the content of 
communications.”), aff’d, No. 16-mc-80263-RS, 2017 WL 3478809 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 
2017). 
 211. Docket No. 17-2, supra note 12. 
 212. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft II), 855 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 
2017) (Carney, J., concurring) (“We recognize at the same time that in many ways the SCA 
has been left behind by technology.  It is overdue for a congressional revision that would 
continue to protect privacy but would more effectively balance concerns of international 
comity with law enforcement needs and service provider obligations in the global context in 
which this case arose.”); Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain 
E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft I), 829 F.3d 197, 
233 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring) (“Although I believe that we have reached the 
correct result as a matter of interpreting the statute before us, I believe even more strongly that 
the statute should be revised . . . .”), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
138 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-2). 
 213. See Smith, supra note 3. 
 214. See, e.g., Brief for the States of Vermont et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 6–17, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-2). 
 215. See Daskal, supra note 15. 
 216. Id. 
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that [U.S.] law enforcement can access data held by a domestically based 
company anywhere.”217  The potential ramifications of each of these 
outcomes are addressed in turn. 
1.  Holding for Microsoft 
If the Court holds in Microsoft’s favor, providers could continue to invoke 
the decision and deny government requests for data that are stored abroad, no 
matter the strength of the government’s probable cause argument.218  If the 
holding is broad, this would remain true even if both sender and recipient 
were U.S. citizens located in the United States.219  Judges and law 
enforcement officials have noted that this is a troubling result that potentially 
jeopardizes public safety.220 
Furthermore, tying the government’s access to email solely to the location 
where the data is stored leads to some absurd and potentially dangerous 
results.  For example, under the system Microsoft currently uses, which 
allows users to “self-report” a geographic location, someone seeking to elude 
U.S. law enforcement could simply self-report a country outside the United 
States.221  Under Google’s system, which shards data and constantly moves 
it throughout the world, whether the government’s warrant is enforceable 
could hinge on an automated network decision.222  This interpretation of the 
SCA does not balance privacy considerations against law enforcement needs 
but rather places the power to control the reach of an SCA warrant 
exclusively in the hands of service providers.223 
2.  Holding for the Government 
If the Court holds in the government’s favor, U.S. law enforcement officers 
will have unilateral power to access the emails of anyone who uses a service 
provider that can be served with a warrant in the United States.  
Commentators fear that a holding for the government may cause other 
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 221. Microsoft II, 855 F.3d at 64. 
 222. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *26 
(D.D.C. July 31, 2017). 
 223. See Microsoft I, 829 F.3d at 223–24 (“Microsoft does not ask the Court to create, as a 
matter of constitutional law, stricter safeguards on the protection of those emails . . . .  Rather, 
the sole issue involved is whether Microsoft can thwart the government’s otherwise justified 
demand for the emails at issue by the simple expedient of choosing—in its own discretion—
to store them on a server in another country.”). 
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countries to pass stronger prohibitions on data disclosure or to reciprocate 
with similar unilateral access policies that implicate the privacy and security 
of U.S. citizens.224  Increased localization measures and disclosure 
prohibitions tend to make data less secure worldwide.225  Moreover, 
encouraging foreign governments to exercise the same kind of authority 
throughout the world has severe negative privacy implications.226 
Holding for the government could also have negative consequences for 
businesses in the United States.  The sale of internet-connected American 
exports might decline if people believe that using such products exposes them 
to the U.S. government’s jurisdiction and bypasses local privacy 
standards.227  As more products are produced with some element of internet 
connectivity, it is important to recognize that international perceptions about 
U.S. surveillance matter when companies compete for business abroad.228 
Finally, a group of former intelligence and law enforcement officials from 
the United States and Europe, appearing as amici curiae in the Microsoft case, 
have explained how a holding for the government could be potentially 
detrimental for both service providers and law enforcement.229  The brief 
explains how a verdict in favor of the government would burden service 
providers who do business internationally and simultaneously frustrate law 
enforcement efforts.230  It argues that a company that is subject to sanctions 
in one country for conduct compelled by the laws of another country will 
typically exhaust its legal options to challenge an adverse ruling in one forum 
to avoid liability in the other.231  Meanwhile, “law enforcement and 
investigations [are left] in limbo.”232 
3.  A Possible Solution Under the All Writs Act 
Professor Orin Kerr has discussed an alternative to the above potential 
outcomes of Microsoft.  By analyzing the case under the All Writs Act 
(AWA) rather than the SCA, the Court could forge a more nuanced 
solution.233  In short, he explains that it is the AWA, not the SCA, that 
 
 224. Brief of Former Law Enforcement, National Security, and Intelligence Officials as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 5, 9, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (No. 17-2) 
[hereinafter Brief of Former Law Enforcement]. 
 225. See Chander & Lê, supra note 33, at 719 (noting that data localization may undermine 
security by offering criminals the “tempting jackpot” of data gathered in a single location and 
favoring local providers that “may be more likely to have weak security infrastructure than 
companies that continuously improve their security to respond to the ever-growing 
sophistication of cyberthieves”). 
 226. See Daskal, supra note 15. 
 227. See Smith, supra note 3; see also Schwartz, supra note 39 (manuscript at 27) (“In 
much of the world, the choice of a non-U.S. party for a local cloud can be considered as opting 
in to her domestic regulatory system—one in which she enjoys political representation.”). 
 228. See Smith, supra note 3. 
 229. Brief of Former Law Enforcement, supra note 224, at 2–3. 
 230. See id. at 4–7. 
 231. See id. at 6. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Kerr, supra note 87. 
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requires providers to assist the government in accessing records abroad.234  
The AWA authorizes courts to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law.”235  The Court could use this flexible language to hold that providers 
must assist the government in obtaining the foreign-stored data of U.S. 
persons only, which is in line with the understanding that a court’s warrant 
jurisdiction “does not ordinarily extend to the property of foreigners 
abroad.”236 
While this is one potential solution, the argument was not raised below and 
departs from the question on which the Court granted certiorari.  If the case 
were resolved in this way, it would either have to be remanded and reheard 
(delaying the ultimate result, likely for years), or the Court would have to 
take the rare course of asking the parties for supplemental briefing.237 
Professor Jennifer Daskal disagrees with Professor Kerr and has argued 
that the AWA is not a viable solution.238  She argues that the SCA does, in 
fact, compel the provider to retrieve and produce the records at issue.239  The 
AWA would only come into play once the Court has decided the underlying 
extraterritoriality issue.240  Thus, she argues that the Court remains unable to 
reach this elegant, nuanced solution and that the legislature should act in its 
stead.241 
B.  The Advantages of a Legislative Solution 
The outdated statute that the Justices must apply in this case limits the 
Court’s options.  The ultimate solution to the Microsoft problem must balance 
“effective law enforcement, national sovereignty, international comity, 
Internet openness and efficiency, commerce, and informational privacy.”242  
In general, the legislature is better suited than courts to meet these challenges. 
Privacy protection in the United States is derived both from the Fourth 
Amendment243 and from legislation.244  Legislation can be tailored to adapt 
to changing technology.245  Legislation may also cover areas that lack Fourth 
Amendment protection, either because courts have declined to confront the 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). 
 236. See Kerr, supra note 87. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Jennifer Daskal, Why Microsoft Challenged the Right Law:  A Response to Orin 
Kerr, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/48907/microsoft-
challenged-law-response-orin-kerr/ [https://perma.cc/W88B-Q2UG]. 
 239. Id. (“[E]ven if the All Writs Act could have once been relied [on] to authorize the kind 
of search at issue in . . . Microsoft . . . , the SCA now governs.”). 
 240. Id. (“[T]he All Writs Act doesn’t and can’t avoid the key issue in the case—is this a 
territorial or extraterritorial exercise of the government’s warrant authority?”). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Brief of Former Law Enforcement, supra note 224, at 2–3. 
 243. See supra Part I.B. 
 244. See supra Part I.C. 
 245. See Kerr, supra note 110, at 1148–49. 
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issue or because the specific question has not been raised.246  For example, 
Congress’s very intention in passing the the ECPA was to protect electronic 
data where the Fourth Amendment did not.247 
Legislative bodies are also “well situated to gauge changing public 
attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in 
a comprehensive way.”248  This advantage is particularly necessary when 
adapting to new technology, where crafting an effective policy often requires 
more detailed study and a deeper appreciation for the possible ramifications 
that different rules might have.249 
Of course, judicial doctrines tend to move slowly and sweep broadly, and 
search and seizure doctrine is no exception—it takes time to develop and is 
difficult to reverse or limit once in place.250  These limitations have prompted 
the Supreme Court to note that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too 
fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before 
its role in society has become clear.”251 
Concurring in the judgment in Microsoft I, Judge Gerard E. Lynch 
recognized the limits of a judicial solution and was vocal in advocating for a 
legislative solution.252  His concurring opinion articulated many of the policy 
issues presented by this case, and he stressed that the court was limited to 
applying “a default rule of statutory interpretation to a statute that does not 
provide an explicit answer to the question before us.”253  He observed that 
Congress is better positioned to develop a nuanced solution,254 and he 
recognized that a decision by the court for either party could lead to absurd 
results.  He also noted that lawmakers were not so bound—unlike the court, 
they “need not make an all-or-nothing choice.”255 
C.  Envisioning the SCA’s Replacement 
This Part surveys some positions taken by two of the major stakeholders 
who have testified before Congress on this issue—service providers and law 
 
 246. For example, despite the trend in favor of adopting the Sixth Circuit’s Warshak 
holding, whether emails held by a third party can receive the full protection of the Fourth 
Amendment remains an open question because the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed 
the issue. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 247. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 248. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 249. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 824 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that “the legislative 
process has considerable advantages in developing knowledge about the far-reaching 
technological advances that render today’s surveillance methods drastically different from 
what has existed in the past”). 
 250. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (remarking that modern privacy 
protection should not be “left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the 
Fourth Amendment”). 
 251. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
 252. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft I), 829 F.3d 197, 231–32 (2d Cir. 
2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. 
Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-2). 
 253. Id. at 232. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
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enforcement officials.  This Part also discusses some scholarly perspectives 
on the matter. 
1.  Service Providers Call for a Nuanced Legislative Solution 
Some major service providers, driven by their concerns over conflicting 
data privacy laws and the illogical results that come from applying U.S. laws 
based on server location, advocate for a legislative solution. 
Even in the wake of its victory in the Second Circuit, Microsoft has 
advocated amending the SCA.256  Microsoft’s President and Chief Legal 
Officer Brad Smith has noted that if the SCA is not modernized, service 
providers will be put in a precarious position when the EU’s pending GDPR 
and other, similar laws make cross-border data transfers unlawful.257  He has 
also raised concerns about the international reaction if the United States 
asserts a unilateral right to access the emails of foreign citizens.258  Among 
other concerns, he fears that the resulting erosion of international trust would 
have a negative economic effect.259 
Similarly, Google representative Richard Salgado testified before 
Congress that new legislation should focus on the location and nationality of 
the user and “eschew data location as a relevant consideration in determining 
whether a particular country can exercise jurisdiction over a service 
provider.”260  Based on user identity and location, he suggested a framework 
that would provide notice of records requests to foreign governments and 
give the United States reciprocal treatment.261  If there were any concerns 
related to the release of certain records, this notice would provide friendly 
foreign governments an opportunity to raise their concerns diplomatically 
and perhaps even levy a challenge in a U.S. court.262  A system where law 
enforcement’s access to data is based on the identity of the user rather than 
the storage location echoes a solution proposed by several other 
commentators.263  Legislative proposals like the ICPA, discussed in Part II.D, 
have also adopted this approach.264 
2.  Law Enforcement Officers Call for Clarity 
Both federal and state governments have criticized the Microsoft I decision 
for frustrating law enforcement efforts to obtain evidence, especially in 
investigations “where the victim, the offender, and the account holder are all 
 
 256. See Smith, supra note 3 (“[Microsoft would] prefer to keep working alongside the 
DOJ and before Congress on enacting new law . . . that works for everyone rather than arguing 
about an outdated law.  We think the legislative path is better for the country too.”). 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. Statement, Richard Salgado, supra note 129, at 4. 
 261. See id. at 5. 
 262. See id. 
 263. See, e.g., Kerr supra note 4, at 416; Daskal, supra note 15. 
 264. See infra Part II.D. 
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within the United States.”265  The DOJ has proclaimed that the Second 
Circuit’s holding has thwarted legitimate law enforcement efforts in cases 
where companies have withheld data.266  Examples include cases where 
quick access to the records would have helped to identify and locate child 
exploitation victims, locate a fugitive who skipped bail before standing trial 
in a child pornography prosecution, and discover coconspirators in a case 
involving hacking and stolen identities.267 
The DOJ has suggested amending the SCA so that the law would apply in 
the manner that it did prior to Microsoft I.268  Speaking before the Senate on 
behalf of the DOJ, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brad Wiegmann 
downplayed concerns about international comity and conflicts of law, stating 
that those problems “are traditionally avoided through mechanisms such as 
prosecutorial discretion, court supervision, diplomacy, and economic 
considerations.”269  In his estimation, new legislation that is too concerned 
with comity would likely tie law enforcement’s hands and would be 
inconsistent with the way other countries treat their domestic providers.270 
Professor Andrew Keane Woods has advocated a similar approach.  He 
has suggested clarification that SCA warrants only “operate” at the place 
where law enforcement searches or seizes the data (i.e., the domestic location 
where law enforcement officers actually are given the data by the 
provider).271  He further suggests that an alternative approach would be to 
explicitly declare that SCA warrants do have extraterritorial reach in 
Microsoft-like circumstances.272  Similar to Deputy Assistant Director 
Wiegmann, Professor Woods believes that the concerns over conflicts of law 
are overstated and easily dealt with by traditional judicial mechanisms.273  He 
analogizes the records at issue here to banking records.274  This analysis is 
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consistent with his position that “[m]any of the features that are cited as 
evidence of data’s unique properties are in fact neither novel nor unique to 
data.”275 
D.  Proposed Legislation:  
The International Communications Privacy Act 
A legislative effort to amend the SCA in response to the concerns raised 
above is underway.276  The version of the ICPA discussed in this Part277 was 
introduced in the Senate on July 27, 2017,278 and in the House on September 
8, 2017.279  The bipartisan bill explicitly acknowledges that legislation in this 
area needs to consider the legitimate needs of U.S. law enforcement agencies, 
the privacy interests of customers, and the interest foreign governments have 
in protecting their citizens’ “human rights, civil liberties and privacy.”280  
The ICPA would require a warrant for all contents of stored data, regardless 
of where they are stored.281  It also would provide comity-based procedural 
protections to users who are located outside the United States and are 
determined to be nationals of “qualifying foreign countr[ies].”282 
The ICPA would make the location of data storage irrelevant to the 
determination whether U.S. law enforcement can compel production of the 
data.283  Rather, any provider that stores data284 could be compelled to 
disclose the contents of that data with a warrant, provided that the 
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governmental entity has jurisdiction over the offense.285  Such a warrant 
would be “issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.”286 
Under the ICPA, the Attorney General would publish a list of “qualifying 
foreign countries” who have a qualified right287 to be notified of, and file an 
objection to, warrants issued for records of their non-U.S.-located 
nationals.288  To qualify, a foreign government would agree not to notify the 
target subscriber of the warrant or the investigation.289  The foreign 
government would also have to agree to handle requests for any U.S. person’s 
data in a reciprocal fashion.290  Finally, the Attorney General would also 
consult with the Secretary of State to determine whether the country has 
sufficient privacy, civil liberties, and human rights protections; whether the 
country has a record of cooperating with the U.S. government; and whether 
it can be counted on not to impede U.S. investigations or undermine U.S. 
foreign relations if it did receive notice of a warrant.291 
Assuming at least one country “qualifies” under the ICPA’s criteria, the 
bill would require that warrants state the “nationality and location” of the 
subscriber whose records are to be released.292  If that information could not 
“reasonably be determined,” the warrant would have to include “a full and 
complete statement of the investigative steps” that proved unsuccessful in 
determining the subscriber’s location and nationality.293  However, this 
requirement would only benefit qualifying countries.294  If no foreign country 
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qualifies, then the default rule would require disclosure of the requested data 
upon service of a warrant on the provider.295  In such a situation, the warrant 
would not need to mention the subscriber’s nationality, location, or what 
steps were taken in an attempt to determine that information.296 
Both service providers and qualifying foreign countries would be able to 
object to the release of records under the ICPA.297  If a warrant under the 
ICPA sought the records of a non-U.S.-located national of a qualifying 
foreign country, the U.S. government would be required to notify the foreign 
country’s “Central Authority.”298  The notice would have to include the 
name, nationality, and location of the subscriber and service provider, as well 
as an explanation of the relevant events and why records are sought.299  
However, a qualifying foreign country could not unilaterally quash the 
warrant.  A country or service provider objecting to the warrant would first 
have to demonstrate that compliance would violate “the laws of a foreign 
country.”300  If disclosure would be illegal under the relevant country’s laws, 
the court would have to weigh the foreign country’s and provider’s interests 
against those of the U.S. government.301 
Thus, the ICPA would both expand and contract the government’s existing 
warrant power under the SCA.  The bill divorces the reach of the warrant 
from the data’s storage location, which gives the government the ability to 
investigate any crime over which it has jurisdiction.302  Before getting the 
warrant, however, the government would have to make a good-faith effort to 
determine the nationality of its target and, if the subscriber is a national of a 
certain foreign country, that country’s government or the service provider 
could move to quash or modify the warrant.303 
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III.  A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION THAT SEPARATES 
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SEARCHES 
ON THE BASIS OF USER IDENTITY 
This term, the Supreme Court is set to address the question “[w]hether a 
United States provider of email services must comply with a probable-cause-
based warrant issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 by making disclosure in the 
United States of electronic communications within that provider’s control, 
even if the provider has decided to store that material abroad.”304  The answer 
will settle a question of statutory interpretation, but it is unlikely to solve the 
deeper issue of how the law should treat data that can be stored worldwide 
with no geographic connection to its owner.305  Interpretations of existing 
law either grant protections based on unpredictable and (from the perspective 
of many subscribers) arbitrary location of a server or permit law enforcement 
to unilaterally collect the data of foreign citizens stored abroad.306 
In the long term, the SCA simply cannot be stretched far enough to address 
the relevant equities—hence calls from all quarters for its amendment.307  
Given the limitations of the current statute308 and the legal doctrines that 
courts have at their disposal,309 no judicial response can fully address the 
issues at play.  The SCA’s vague language leaves too much space for the 
interposition of traditional warrant and subpoena doctrines,310 neither of 
which is a perfect fit given the nature of this technology.  Traditional warrant 
doctrines are tied to the physical world, and the territoriality question raised 
in Microsoft eludes any easy answer grounded in the operation of traditional 
search warrants.311  Likewise, the subpoena analogy does not quite fit in the 
context of a statute that was intended to give the contents of communications 
greater protection than a subpoena typically provides.312 
Similarly, the presumption against extraterritoriality has mostly muddled 
this issue.313  Though the Supreme Court must interpret the SCA in light of 
its precedent and canons, this will not solve the underlying problems of a 
statute that is past its expiration date.314  Ultimately, the legislature is best 
equipped to draw lines and establish rules that are needed to govern access to 
this complex and still-developing technology.315  Therefore, this Part 
proposes a legislative solution that modifies the proposed ICPA. 
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A.  What the ICPA Gets Right and What It Lacks 
The ICPA provides a good framework and starting place for discussion, as 
it already incorporates two important features:  (1) a probable cause warrant 
requirement for all communicative content and (2) a user-nationality-based 
system for determining the reach of warrants.316  However, the statute may 
fail to obviate fears from the rest of the world that law enforcement in the 
United States is using service providers located here to reach the records of 
foreign citizens located abroad.317 
The ICPA addresses the specific problem raised in Microsoft:  the text of 
the bill states that warrants for electronic data would be effective regardless 
of the storage location of the records.318  The bill also provides some comity-
based safeguards in the form of its notice requirement and a balancing test in 
response to objections from some countries.319 
One problem with the ICPA is that, beneath the notice requirement and the 
comity balancing test, there is still a default presumption that U.S. law 
enforcement should have access to the records of foreign nationals that are 
not stored in the United States.320  Thus, the act conflates, in certain 
circumstances, two sets of subscribers who are in very different positions:  
U.S. citizens and residents who are rationally governed by U.S. laws and law 
enforcement on the one hand and foreign citizens whose only connection to 
the United States is a service provider doing business there on the other.  
While law enforcement should be able to access the latter group’s records in 
some instances, international comity justifies some additional procedural 
safeguards. 
B.  Governing Access to United States and Foreign User Data 
with Fully Separate Procedures 
This Note suggests the creation of two distinct forms of legal process, one 
governing primarily “domestic” requests and another governing wholly 
extraterritorial requests.  Creating a separate order for obtaining the records 
of a foreign person stored outside the United States would clarify the bill and 
allow the law to deal with these distinct groups on different terms.321 
 
 316. See supra notes 281–82 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 292–93 and 
accompanying text.  The updated legislative proposal, the CLOUD Act, would not explicitly 
require a warrant for the contents of data. See supra note 281.  Under the CLOUD Act, a user’s 
identity could possibly be grounds to limit the reach of a warrant but that bill’s identity-based 
protections are less robust than the ICPA’s. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra Parts I.A.2, II.A.2. 
 318. See supra notes 283, 285 and accompanying text.  The CLOUD Act has a similar 
provision. See supra note 283.  
 319. See supra notes 288–301 and accompanying text.  The CLOUD Act permits a provider 
to notify a qualifying foreign government of a request in certain circumstances but does not 
require notice. See supra note 287.  The CLOUD Act also would allow courts to engage in a 
comity analysis if certain conditions are met or if such an analysis would be appropriate under 
common law. See supra notes 293, 301. 
 320. See supra notes 292–96 and accompanying text.  This would also be the default 
presumption under the CLOUD Act. See supra note 293. 
 321. The choice to call the domestic instrument a “warrant” and the extraterritorial 
instrument an “order” signals that domestically, the traditional Fourth Amendment limits 
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Under this proposal, the law would provide for two separate investigative 
instruments:  a “domestic warrant” that applies to the records of U.S. 
persons322 regardless of where those records are stored and an “international 
order”—a separate court order to investigate foreign conduct having 
substantial U.S. effects.  The government would apply for the international 
order when it was unable to demonstrate that the records belong to a U.S. 
person.  Therefore, much like the ICPA, part of the application process for 
either of these instruments would involve the government establishing the 
nationality and location of the user. 
1.  The Domestic Warrant 
Qualifying for the domestic warrant would require probable cause, 
including a showing that the subscriber whose information is sought is a U.S. 
person.  Upon that showing a warrant would issue, and the provider would 
be required to disclose the content regardless of its storage location.  The 
reach of this domestic warrant would be clear, and it would have the 
additional privacy benefit of invoking traditional Fourth Amendment 
protections.323 
2.  The International Order 
For foreign citizens, two safeguards would ensure that records are not 
disclosed in violation of another nation’s sovereignty or privacy laws.  First, 
the international order would require probable cause to obtain the records and 
require detailed evidence as to the domestic effects of the investigated crime.  
This requirement intends to make judges gatekeepers charged with 
conducting a comity-like analysis prior to issuing the international order, 
during which they would weigh U.S. law enforcement interests against 
foreign sovereignty interests.324 
Second, once an international order was issued, a provider would be 
allowed to deny325 the request on a showing that compliance would violate 
the privacy laws of the nation at issue.  The burden would rest on the provider 
 
govern the warrant.  Calling the extraterritorial instrument an “order” does not imply less 
probable cause protection but recognizes the extraterritorial limits on warrants and the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 322. The term “U.S. persons” as used throughout this Part refers to citizens and permanent 
residents of the United States. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 324. The extent of the suspect’s contacts with the United States, including his or her 
presence within the United States during the investigation, would factor into the comity 
analysis.  The comity analysis also addresses the situation where a user is anonymous—where 
there is no competing foreign interest (because the user’s nationality and location are 
unknown), U.S. law enforcement interests will weigh more heavily in the interest of issuing 
the order. 
 325. This would not affect counterterrorism surveillance pursuant to FISA. See supra note 
111 and accompanying text. 
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to produce evidence of conflicting foreign law.326  This default rule shows 
regard for the laws of other nations and recognizes that the U.S. government 
is not acting unilaterally.  Rather, it would be compelling the action of a third-
party provider who is subject to the laws of multiple jurisdictions. 
With these default rules in place, the statute would also leave space for 
diplomatic efforts to develop procedures specific to certain countries, or 
groups of countries, that could be negotiated in the form of bilateral or 
multilateral reciprocal agreements.  These procedures might include a notice 
requirement, a relaxation of the heightened domestic effect showing, or 
expedited processing. 
3.  The Warrant and International Order System:  
Benefits of Separate Procedures 
The major benefit of this system would be clarity for all parties involved 
and a built-in comity analysis that would not require a challenge to the 
underlying warrant.  This system would also address the presumption against 
extraterritoriality by explicitly setting forth when and how each order would 
apply in contexts that are arguably extraterritorial.  There would be no 
ambiguity that would trigger the Morrison test.327  This would resolve the 
central debate of Microsoft in a nuanced way that would be difficult for the 
Court to get to on its own.328  Additionally, this system would give clear 
notice to providers in structuring their compliance procedures and would 
prevent providers from storing records abroad in a manner that would 
preclude their release. 
Law enforcement officers, likewise, would have clear notice of the limits 
of each of the two forms of legal process.  For cases where there is no foreign 
element, the process would be more streamlined and prevent the possibility 
of objections based on storage location.  Any additional burden to U.S. law 
enforcement would only arise in cases where it ought to—where the reach of 
U.S. law enforcement is legitimately questionable.  Even given this necessary 
limitation, the statute would only preclude law enforcement officers from 
accessing records without foreign assistance in limited circumstances.  
Moreover, the executive branch would remain free to alleviate much of the 
burden by entering into more effective international agreements where 
necessary. 
Users of these services in the United States would know that a modern 
statutory framework is in place to protect their privacy against unreasonable 
government intrusion, separate from the development of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.329  A consistent level of privacy protection would apply to every 
U.S. customer’s records.  Similarly, although the probable cause protection 
 
 326. For this safeguard to take effect, there would have to be a “true conflict,” making it 
impossible for the provider to comply with both countries’ laws simultaneously. Cf. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1993). 
 327. See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
 329. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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for the international order would not necessarily have constitutional 
backing,330 it would demonstrate a good-faith commitment to personal 
privacy and assuage fears abroad of limitless U.S. surveillance. 
Finally, this enhanced baseline for access to foreign records would give 
both foreign governments and their citizens assurance that they are not being 
spied on by U.S. law enforcement agencies simply by choosing to use a U.S.-
based service provider.  By taking comity into account before any order is 
issued, and by establishing a procedure to object when a data transfer would 
violate local law, the statute would have both the appearance and effect of 
according due respect to foreign privacy and data security laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Cloud technology is increasingly pervasive in modern life around the 
world,331 but the law that governs a significant aspect of this technology in 
the United States has failed to keep pace.332  The statute that regulates law 
enforcement’s access to communications stored by cloud technology is out 
of date and eludes any interpretation that would allow for a meaningful 
extraterritoriality analysis.333  The Microsoft opinions in the Second Circuit 
demonstrate the way that the statute forces courts to take an all-or-nothing 
position based on the often arbitrary decision service providers make about 
where to physically store data.334 
Due to legislative shortcomings and a general institutional disadvantage, 
courts are ill equipped on their own to draw the necessary lines between those 
who should be primarily governed by U.S. laws and those whose 
governments have a right to expect that their own laws will govern.  These 
are issues that deserve a thoughtful legislative study that accounts for all of 
the various privacy, sovereignty, and law enforcement equities at play. 
A lasting and effective solution to the question of what limits the law 
places on U.S. law enforcement’s reach into the cloud should come in the 
form of legislation that replaces the outdated SCA.335  The ICPA provides a 
good starting point, but that bill still conflates foreign subscribers of service 
providers located in the United States with U.S. persons.336  The law should 
deal with each of these two groups, which have different expectations about 
privacy and are subject to different levels of constitutional protection, on their 
own terms.337 
Creating two separate investigative tools—one that is unconcerned with 
international comity by default because it governs only the records of U.S. 
persons and another that has built-in checks on extraterritorial extension of 
U.S. searches and seizures—clarifies the law for providers, law enforcement, 
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and foreign governments.338  It helps to ensure that U.S. service providers 
will be able to continue doing business abroad without having to choose 
between foreign data privacy laws and U.S. investigative demands.339  
Further, it demonstrates respect for foreign sovereignty and encourages 
international cooperation while discouraging defensive data localization 
measures.340  This two-prong framework addresses the shortcomings in the 
current legislation and provides a logical system for governing law 
enforcement access to cloud data. 
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